(Mt) – Strayer Intelligence Capable of Being Both Beneficial & Potentially Harmful

FIND A SOLUTION AT Academic Writers Bay

CHAPTER ONE WHAT IS “INTELLIGENCE”? What is intelligence? Why is its definition an issue? Virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what “intelligence” means, or at least how the author intends to use the term. This editorial fact reveals much about the field of intelligence. If this were a text on any other government function—defense, housing, transportation, diplomacy, agriculture—there would be little or no confusion about, or need to explain, what was being discussed. Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First, much of what goes on is secret. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, who, in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret. All of this secrecy leads some authors to believe that issues exist about which they cannot write or may not have sufficient knowledge. Thus, they feel the need to describe the limits of their work. Although numerous aspects of intelligence are—and deserve to be—kept secret, this is not an impediment to describing basic roles, processes, functions, and issues. Second, this same secrecy can be a source of consternation to citizens, especially in a democratic country such as the United States. The U.S. intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon. Since its creation in 1947, the intelligence community has been the subject of much ambivalence. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. Moreover, the intelligence community engages in activities—spying, eavesdropping, covert action—that some people regard as antithetical to what they believe the United States should be as a nation and as a model for other nations. Some citizens have difficulty reconciling American ideals and goals with the realities of intelligence. To many people, intelligence seems little different from information, except that it is probably secret. However, distinguishing between the two is important. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained, and analyzed responds to the needs of policy makers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence. WHY HAVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES? The major theme of this book is that intelligence exists solely to support policy makers in myriad ways. Any other activity is either wasteful or illegal. The book’s focus is firmly on the relationship between intelligence, in all of its aspects, and policy making. The policy maker is not a passive recipient of intelligence but actively influences all aspects of intelligence. (This concept of the policy maker–intelligence relationship would also be true for business as well as government. The focus in this book is on governments.) Intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons: to avoid strategic surprise; to provide long-term expertise; to support the policy process; and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods. To Avoid Strategic Surprise. The foremost goal of any intelligence community must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence. This goal may sound grandiose and far-fetched, but several times since the early twentieth century, nations have been subjected to direct military attacks for which they were, at best, inadequately prepared—Russia was surprised by Japan in 1904, both the Soviet Union (by Germany) and the United States (by Japan) in 1941, and Israel (by Egypt and Syria) in 1973. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States are another example of this pattern, albeit carried out on a much more limited scale. (See box, “The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor?”) Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise, which is of a different magnitude and, as Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University pointed out in his article, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” cannot be wholly avoided. To put the difference between the two types of surprise in perspective, suppose, for example, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones are business partners. Every Friday, while Mr. Smith is lunching with a client, Mr. Jones helps himself to money from the petty cash. One afternoon Mr. Smith comes back from lunch earlier than expected, catching Mr. Jones red-handed. “I’m surprised!” they exclaim simultaneously. Mr. Jones’s surprise is tactical: He knew what he was doing but did not expect to get caught; Mr. Smith’s surprise is strategic: He had no idea the embezzlement was happening. Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence, although it can be psychologically devastating. To some extent, the 9/11 attacks were tactical surprises. Repetitive tactical surprise, however, suggests some significant intelligence problems. The advent of missiles with intercontinental ranges, armed with nuclear weapons, put an increased emphasis on intelligence to avoid surprise attack for the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the use of cyberspace offers possibilities for devastating attacks that could be even more difficult to detect or to deter. The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor? Many people immediately described the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon as a “new Pearl Harbor.” This is understandable on an emotional level, as both were surprise attacks. However, important differences exist. First, Pearl Harbor was a strategic surprise. U.S. policy makers expected a move by Japan but not against the United States. The Soviet Union was seen as a possible target, but the greatest expectation and fear was a Japanese attack on European colonies in Southeast Asia that bypassed U.S. possessions, thus allowing Japan to continue to expand its empire without bringing the United States into the war. The terrorist attacks were more of a tactical surprise. The enmity of Osama bin Laden and his willingness to attack U.S. targets had been amply demonstrated in earlier attacks on the East African embassies and on the USS Cole. Throughout the summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence officials had warned of the likelihood of another bin Laden attack. What was not known—or guessed—were the target and the means of attack. Second, Japan and the Axis powers had the capability to defeat and destroy U.S. power and the U.S. way of life. The terrorists do not pose a threat on the same level. To Provide Long-Term Expertise. Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policy makers are transients. The average time in office for a president of the United States is five years. Secretaries of state and defense serve for less time than that, and their senior subordinates—deputy, under, and assistant secretaries—often hold their positions for even shorter periods. Although these individuals often enter their respective offices with an extensive background in their fields, it is virtually impossible for them to be well versed in all of the matters with which they will be dealing. Inevitably, they will have to call upon others whose knowledge and expertise on certain issues are greater. Much knowledge and expertise on national security issues reside in the intelligence community, where the analytical cadre is more stable than the political office holders. (This changed somewhat in the United States after 2001. See chap. 6.) Stability tends to be greater in intelligence agencies, particularly in higherlevel positions, than in foreign affairs and defense agencies. Also, intelligence agencies tend to have far fewer political appointees than do the State and Defense Departments. However, these two personnel differences (stability and nonpolitical) have diminished somewhat over the past decade. As will be discussed later, the senior position in U.S. intelligence, the director of national intelligence (DNI), had been CHAPTER TWO THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE Each nation practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that have a common heritage and share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—the group known as the Five Eyes. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Therefore, this chapter discusses the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function. The phrase “intelligence community” is used throughout the book as well as in most other discussions of U.S. intelligence. The word “community” is particularly apt in describing U.S. intelligence. The community is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but they serve different needs or different policy makers and work under various lines of authority and control. The intelligence community grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional. One director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms (1966–1973), testified before Congress that, despite all of the criticisms of the structure and functioning of the intelligence community, if one were to create it from scratch, much the same community would likely emerge. Helms’s focus was not on the structure of the community but on the services it provides, which are multiple, varied, and supervised by a number of individuals. This approach to intelligence is unique to the United States, although others have copied facets of it. The 2004 legislation that created a director of national intelligence (DNI; see chap. 3) made changes in the superstructure of the intelligence community but not to the essential functions of the various agencies. MAJOR THEMES A number of major themes contributed to the development of the U.S. intelligence system. Liberty and Security. Throughout the history of the United States under the Constitution there has been a constant debate and sometimes tension between two equally desired outcomes: liberty and security. These goals are not in opposition but, at certain times, one value has had to give way to the other. In the John Adams administration (1797–1801), Congress passed legislation, the Alien and Sedition Acts, designed to limit criticism of the government in speech or the press. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln (1861–1865) suspended habeas corpus (the requirement to be charged with a crime after arrest) several times (as did Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy). During World War I, Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) used the Espionage Act to arrest those opposed to certain wartime policies. In the period after that war, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer conducted raids and arrest against American left-wing radicals. At the onset of U.S. entry into World War II, Japanese citizens (Nisei) were forced into internment camps. During the early part of the cold war, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, R-WI, held numerous hearings to root out suspected Communist infiltrators in the government, often with little evidence. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) and Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) both used the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate war and civil rights protestors. Finally, during the campaign against terrorists there have been concerns about National Security Agency (NSA) programs and their breadth and degree of intrusiveness within the United States. The Novelty of U.S. Intelligence. Of the major powers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has the briefest history of significant intelligence beyond wartime emergencies. The great Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, wrote about the importance of intelligence in the fifth century BCE. British intelligence dates from the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), French intelligence from the tenure of Cardinal Richelieu (1624–1642), and Russian intelligence from the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533– 1584). Even given that the United States did not come into being until 1776, its intelligence experience is brief. The first glimmer of a national intelligence enterprise did not appear until 1940. Although permanent and specific naval and military intelligence units date from the late nineteenth century, a broader U.S. national intelligence capability began to arise only with the creation of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, the predecessor of the World War II–era Office of Strategic Services (OSS). What explains this 165-year absence of organized U.S. intelligence? For most of its history, the United States did not have strong foreign policy interests beyond its immediate borders. The success of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (which stated that the United States would resist any European attempt to colonize in the Western Hemisphere), abetted by the acquiescence and tacit support of Britain, the most powerful of the European states, solved the basic security interests of the United States and its broader foreign policy interests. The need for better intelligence became apparent only after the United States achieved the status of a world power and became involved in wide-ranging international issues at the end of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside the Western Hemisphere, or—with the exception of the Civil War (1861–1865)—from large-scale internal dissent that was inimical to its form of government. This benign environment, so unlike that faced by all European states, undercut any perceived need for national intelligence. Until the cold war with the Soviet Union commenced in 1945, the United States severely limited expenditures on defense and related activities during peacetime. Intelligence, already underappreciated, fell into this category. Historians have noted, however, that intelligence absorbed a remarkable and anomalous 12 percent of the federal budget under President George Washington. This was the high-water mark of intelligence spending in the federal budget, a percentage that was never approached again. The intelligence request for fiscal year 2020 amounts to $85.75 billion, the highest request for intelligence, which is 1.8% of the total budget request. These data suggest that although there has been a great increase in intelligence spending in terms of dollars since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence has not increased substantially as a national priority since 2001, going from 1.6 percent of the federal budget during the pre- and postattack period and increasing slightly thereafter. In other words, intelligence spending has increased as has the rest of the federal budget, but intelligence has increased only barely the share of the federal budget that it consumes, which is a more important indicator than dollarspending levels. Intelligence was a novelty in the 1940s. At that time, policy makers in both the executive branch and Congress viewed intelligence as a newcomer to national security. Even within the Army and Navy, intelligence developed relatively late and was far from robust until well into the twentieth century. As a result, intelligence did not have long-established patrons in the government, but it did have many rivals with competing departments, particularly the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, none of which was willing to share its sources of information. Furthermore, intelligence did not have well-established traditions or modes of operation and thus was forced to create these during two periods of extreme pressure: World War II and the cold war. A Threat-Based Foreign Policy. With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed a vested interest in the international status quo. This interest became more pronounced after the Spanish-American War in 1898. With the acquisition of a small colonial empire, the United States achieved a satisfactory international position—largely self-sufficient and largely unthreatened. However, the twentieth century saw the repeated rise of powers whose foreign policies were direct threats to the status quo: Kaiserine Germany in World War I, the Axis in World War II, and then the Soviet Union during the cold war. Responding to these threats became the mainstay of U.S. national security policy. The threats also gave focus to much of the operational side of U.S. intelligence, from its initial experience in the OSS during World War II to broader covert actions in the cold war. Intelligence operations were one way in which the United States countered these threats. The terrorism threat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries fits the same pattern of an opponent who rejects the international status quo and has emerged as an issue for U.S. national security. However, now the enemy is not a nation-state—even when terrorists have the support of nation-states or appear to be quasi-states, as did the Islamic State (ISIL) for a period— which makes it more difficult to deal withCHAPTER TWO THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE Each nation practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that have a common heritage and share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—the group known as the Five Eyes. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Therefore, this chapter discusses the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function. The phrase “intelligence community” is used throughout the book as well as in most other discussions of U.S. intelligence. The word “community” is particularly apt in describing U.S. intelligence. The community is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but they serve different needs or different policy makers and work under various lines of authority and control. The intelligence community grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional. One director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms (1966–1973), testified before Congress that, despite all of the criticisms of the structure and functioning of the intelligence community, if one were to create it from scratch, much the same community would likely emerge. Helms’s focus was not on the structure of the community but on the services it provides, which are multiple, varied, and supervised by a number of individuals. This approach to intelligence is unique to the United States, although others have copied facets of it. The 2004 legislation that created a director of national intelligence (DNI; see chap. 3) made changes in the superstructure of the intelligence community but not to the essential functions of the various agencies. MAJOR THEMES A number of major themes contributed to the development of the U.S. intelligence system. Liberty and Security. Throughout the history of the United States under the Constitution there has been a constant debate and sometimes tension between two equally desired outcomes: liberty and security. These goals are not in opposition but, at certain times, one value has had to give way to the other. In the John Adams administration (1797–1801), Congress passed legislation, the Alien and Sedition Acts, designed to limit criticism of the government in speech or the press. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln (1861–1865) suspended habeas corpus (the requirement to be charged with a crime after arrest) several times (as did Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy). During World War I, Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) used the Espionage Act to arrest those opposed to certain wartime policies. In the period after that war, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer conducted raids and arrest against American left-wing radicals. At the onset of U.S. entry into World War II, Japanese citizens (Nisei) were forced into internment camps. During the early part of the cold war, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, R-WI, held numerous hearings to root out suspected Communist infiltrators in the government, often with little evidence. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) and Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) both used the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate war and civil rights protestors. Finally, during the campaign against terrorists there have been concerns about National Security Agency (NSA) programs and their breadth and degree of intrusiveness within the United States. The Novelty of U.S. Intelligence. Of the major powers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has the briefest history of significant intelligence beyond wartime emergencies. The great Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, wrote about the importance of intelligence in the fifth century BCE. British intelligence dates from the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), French intelligence from the tenure of Cardinal Richelieu (1624–1642), and Russian intelligence from the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533– 1584). Even given that the United States did not come into being until 1776, its intelligence experience is brief. The first glimmer of a national intelligence enterprise did not appear until 1940. Although permanent and specific naval and military intelligence units date from the late nineteenth century, a broader U.S. national intelligence capability began to arise only with the creation of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, the predecessor of the World War II–era Office of Strategic Services (OSS). What explains this 165-year absence of organized U.S. intelligence? For most of its history, the United States did not have strong foreign policy interests beyond its immediate borders. The success of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (which stated that the United States would resist any European attempt to colonize in the Western Hemisphere), abetted by the acquiescence and tacit support of Britain, the most powerful of the European states, solved the basic security interests of the United States and its broader foreign policy interests. The need for better intelligence became apparent only after the United States achieved the status of a world power and became involved in wide-ranging international issues at the end of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside the Western Hemisphere, or—with the exception of the Civil War (1861–1865)—from large-scale internal dissent that was inimical to its form of government. This benign environment, so unlike that faced by all European states, undercut any perceived need for national intelligence. Until the cold war with the Soviet Union commenced in 1945, the United States severely limited expenditures on defense and related activities during peacetime. Intelligence, already underappreciated, fell into this category. Historians have noted, however, that intelligence absorbed a remarkable and anomalous 12 percent of the federal budget under President George Washington. This was the high-water mark of intelligence spending in the federal budget, a percentage that was never approached again. The intelligence request for fiscal year 2020 amounts to $85.75 billion, the highest request for intelligence, which is 1.8% of the total budget request. These data suggest that although there has been a great increase in intelligence spending in terms of dollars since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence has not increased substantially as a national priority since 2001, going from 1.6 percent of the federal budget during the pre- and postattack period and increasing slightly thereafter. In other words, intelligence spending has increased as has the rest of the federal budget, but intelligence has increased only barely the share of the federal budget that it consumes, which is a more important indicator than dollarspending levels. Intelligence was a novelty in the 1940s. At that time, policy makers in both the executive branch and Congress viewed intelligence as a newcomer to national security. Even within the Army and Navy, intelligence developed relatively late and was far from robust until well into the twentieth century. As a result, intelligence did not have long-established patrons in the government, but it did have many rivals with competing departments, particularly the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, none of which was willing to share its sources of information. Furthermore, intelligence did not have well-established traditions or modes of operation and thus was forced to create these during two periods of extreme pressure: World War II and the cold war. A Threat-Based Foreign Policy. With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed a vested interest in the international status quo. This interest became more pronounced after the Spanish-American War in 1898. With the acquisition of a small colonial empire, the United States achieved a satisfactory international position—largely self-sufficient and largely unthreatened. However, the twentieth century saw the repeated rise of powers whose foreign policies were direct threats to the status quo: Kaiserine Germany in World War I, the Axis in World War II, and then the Soviet Union during the cold war. Responding to these threats became the mainstay of U.S. national security policy. The threats also gave focus to much of the operational side of U.S. intelligence, from its initial experience in the OSS during World War II to broader covert actions in the cold war. Intelligence operations were one way in which the United States countered these threats. The terrorism threat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries fits the same pattern of an opponent who rejects the international status quo and has emerged as an issue for U.S. national security. However, now the enemy is not a nation-state—even when terrorists have the support of nation-states or appear to be quasi-states, as did the Islamic State (ISIL) for a period— which makes it more difficult to deal withCHAPTER TWO THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE Each nation practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that have a common heritage and share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—the group known as the Five Eyes. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Therefore, this chapter discusses the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function. The phrase “intelligence community” is used throughout the book as well as in most other discussions of U.S. intelligence. The word “community” is particularly apt in describing U.S. intelligence. The community is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but they serve different needs or different policy makers and work under various lines of authority and control. The intelligence community grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional. One director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms (1966–1973), testified before Congress that, despite all of the criticisms of the structure and functioning of the intelligence community, if one were to create it from scratch, much the same community would likely emerge. Helms’s focus was not on the structure of the community but on the services it provides, which are multiple, varied, and supervised by a number of individuals. This approach to intelligence is unique to the United States, although others have copied facets of it. The 2004 legislation that created a director of national intelligence (DNI; see chap. 3) made changes in the superstructure of the intelligence community but not to the essential functions of the various agencies. MAJOR THEMES A number of major themes contributed to the development of the U.S. intelligence system. Liberty and Security. Throughout the history of the United States under the Constitution there has been a constant debate and sometimes tension between two equally desired outcomes: liberty and security. These goals are not in opposition but, at certain times, one value has had to give way to the other. In the John Adams administration (1797–1801), Congress passed legislation, the Alien and Sedition Acts, designed to limit criticism of the government in speech or the press. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln (1861–1865) suspended habeas corpus (the requirement to be charged with a crime after arrest) several times (as did Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy). During World War I, Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) used the Espionage Act to arrest those opposed to certain wartime policies. In the period after that war, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer conducted raids and arrest against American left-wing radicals. At the onset of U.S. entry into World War II, Japanese citizens (Nisei) were forced into internment camps. During the early part of the cold war, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, R-WI, held numerous hearings to root out suspected Communist infiltrators in the government, often with little evidence. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) and Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) both used the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate war and civil rights protestors. Finally, during the campaign against terrorists there have been concerns about National Security Agency (NSA) programs and their breadth and degree of intrusiveness within the United States. The Novelty of U.S. Intelligence. Of the major powers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has the briefest history of significant intelligence beyond wartime emergencies. The great Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, wrote about the importance of intelligence in the fifth century BCE. British intelligence dates from the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), French intelligence from the tenure of Cardinal Richelieu (1624–1642), and Russian intelligence from the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533– 1584). Even given that the United States did not come into being until 1776, its intelligence experience is brief. The first glimmer of a national intelligence enterprise did not appear until 1940. Although permanent and specific naval and military intelligence units date from the late nineteenth century, a broader U.S. national intelligence capability began to arise only with the creation of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, the predecessor of the World War II–era Office of Strategic Services (OSS). What explains this 165-year absence of organized U.S. intelligence? For most of its history, the United States did not have strong foreign policy interests beyond its immediate borders. The success of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (which stated that the United States would resist any European attempt to colonize in the Western Hemisphere), abetted by the acquiescence and tacit support of Britain, the most powerful of the European states, solved the basic security interests of the United States and its broader foreign policy interests. The need for better intelligence became apparent only after the United States achieved the status of a world power and became involved in wide-ranging international issues at the end of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside the Western Hemisphere, or—with the exception of the Civil War (1861–1865)—from large-scale internal dissent that was inimical to its form of government. This benign environment, so unlike that faced by all European states, undercut any perceived need for national intelligence. Until the cold war with the Soviet Union commenced in 1945, the United States severely limited expenditures on defense and related activities during peacetime. Intelligence, already underappreciated, fell into this category. Historians have noted, however, that intelligence absorbed a remarkable and anomalous 12 percent of the federal budget under President George Washington. This was the high-water mark of intelligence spending in the federal budget, a percentage that was never approached again. The intelligence request for fiscal year 2020 amounts to $85.75 billion, the highest request for intelligence, which is 1.8% of the total budget request. These data suggest that although there has been a great increase in intelligence spending in terms of dollars since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence has not increased substantially as a national priority since 2001, going from 1.6 percent of the federal budget during the pre- and postattack period and increasing slightly thereafter. In other words, intelligence spending has increased as has the rest of the federal budget, but intelligence has increased only barely the share of the federal budget that it consumes, which is a more important indicator than dollarspending levels. Intelligence was a novelty in the 1940s. At that time, policy makers in both the executive branch and Congress viewed intelligence as a newcomer to national security. Even within the Army and Navy, intelligence developed relatively late and was far from robust until well into the twentieth century. As a result, intelligence did not have long-established patrons in the government, but it did have many rivals with competing departments, particularly the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, none of which was willing to share its sources of information. Furthermore, intelligence did not have well-established traditions or modes of operation and thus was forced to create these during two periods of extreme pressure: World War II and the cold war. A Threat-Based Foreign Policy. With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed a vested interest in the international status quo. This interest became more pronounced after the Spanish-American War in 1898. With the acquisition of a small colonial empire, the United States achieved a satisfactory international position—largely self-sufficient and largely unthreatened. However, the twentieth century saw the repeated rise of powers whose foreign policies were direct threats to the status quo: Kaiserine Germany in World War I, the Axis in World War II, and then the Soviet Union during the cold war. Responding to these threats became the mainstay of U.S. national security policy. The threats also gave focus to much of the operational side of U.S. intelligence, from its initial experience in the OSS during World War II to broader covert actions in the cold war. Intelligence operations were one way in which the United States countered these threats. The terrorism threat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries fits the same pattern of an opponent who rejects the international status quo and has emerged as an issue for U.S. national security. However, now the enemy is not a nation-state—even when terrorists have the support of nation-states or appear to be quasi-states, as did the Islamic State (ISIL) for a period— which makes it more difficult to deal with

• WE OFFER THE BEST CUSTOM PAPER WRITING SERVICES. WE HAVE DONE THIS QUESTION BEFORE, WE CAN ALSO DO IT FOR YOU.
• Assignment status: Already Solved By Our Experts
• (USA, AUS, UK & CA PhD. Writers)
• CLICK HERE TO GET A PROFESSIONAL WRITER TO WORK ON THIS PAPER AND OTHER SIMILAR PAPERS, GET A NON PLAGIARIZED PAPER FROM OUR EXPERTS

QUALITY: 100% ORIGINAL PAPER – NO PLAGIARISM – CUSTOM PAPER

Why Choose Us?

How It Works

• Click on the “Place Your Order” tab at the top menu or “Order Now” icon at the bottom and a new page will appear with an order form to be filled.
• Fill in your paper’s requirements in the “PAPER DETAILS” section.
• Fill in your paper’s academic level, deadline, and the required number of pages from the drop-down menus.
• Click “CREATE ACCOUNT & SIGN IN” to enter your registration details and get an account with us for record-keeping and then, click on “PROCEED TO CHECKOUT” at the bottom of the page.
• From there, the payment sections will show, follow the guided payment process and your order will be available for our writing team to work on it.

About AcademicWritersBay.com

AcademicWritersBay.com is an easy-to-use and reliable service that is ready to assist you with your papers 24/7/ 365days a year. 99% of our customers are happy with their papers. Our team is efficient and will always tackle your essay needs comprehensively assuring you of excellent results. Feel free to ask them anything concerning your essay demands or Order.

AcademicWritersBay.com is a private company that offers academic support and assistance to students at all levels. Our mission is to provide proficient and high quality academic services to our highly esteemed clients. AcademicWritersBay.com is equipped with competent and proficient writers to tackle all types of your academic needs, and provide you with excellent results. Most of our writers are holders of master’s degrees or PhDs, which is an surety of excellent results to our clients. We provide assistance to students all over the world.
We provide high quality term papers, research papers, essays, proposals, theses and many others. At AcademicWritersBay.com, you can be sure of excellent grades in your assignments and final exams.